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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London'
(hereinafter Kelo), upholding a Connecticut statute2 and permitting the
use of eminent domain for private economic development as consistent
with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,3
spurred a level of public outrage unlike any seen in modern times to prior
rulings of the Court. 4 As a result, a flurry of proposed state5 and federal 6
legislation ensued in an effort to counteract the effects of Kelo.
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). Justice Stevens wrote the
majority opinion in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id. at 2658.
Justice O'Connor authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas joined. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, and Justice Thomas
filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
2 The relevant Connecticut statute includes a "declaration of policy" stating that the
acquisition of land by eminent domain for "the continued growth of industry and business," or
economic development, in Connecticut is a "public use" in the "public interest." CoN. GEN.
STAT. § 8-186 et seq. (2006).
3 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "Nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The current test for
whether the exercise of eminent domain satisfies the "public use" portion of the Fifth Amend-
ment is whether or not the exercise has a "public purpose." See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662-63.
The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a strict interpretation of "public use," or a definition
that comprehends the exercise of eminent domain only if the real property seized will be used
by the public. Id.
4 See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9,
2005, at B2; see also Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A12.
5 At last count, approximately 39 states had introduced legislation to limit the use of
eminent domain for private economic development in response to Kelo. See John M. Broder,
States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al; see generally
Terry Pristin, Developers Can't Imagine a World Without Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2006, at C5 (discussing different measures that states have taken in response to Kelo and
noting the opposition to the legislative groundswell from developers, some lawmakers, and the
real estate community). For instance, in California alone, five constitutional amendments and
six proposed pieces of legislation have been put before the California Legislature to counter
the Court's decision in Kelo. Id. In Texas, the legislature acted swiftly and banned the use of
eminent domain on behalf of a private party, except for certain uses. Id. Among these excep-
tions is the taking of land for a new stadium for the Dallas Cowboys football team. Id. In
addition, in Ohio, the legislature placed a one-year moratorium on all takings soon after the
Kelo ruling. Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2006, at
IA.
6 As of November 30, 2005, legislation was passed by Congress and signed into law by
the President that makes appropriations for certain government agencies and provides that no
funds shall be used for federal, state, or local projects that seek to use the power of eminent
domain for economic development that would primarily benefit private parties. See Transpor-
tation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of Colum-
bia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119
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Economic development in the context of eminent domain refers to
the government's taking of property from one party and transferring title
to another private party with the understanding that development of the
property will yield public benefits, such as increased tax revenue or addi-
tional employment opportunities. 7 The Kelo Court reasoned that eco-
nomic development satisfied the Fifth Amendment's "public purpose"
test, so long as the development is part of an "integrated" 8 or "compre-
hensive redevelopment"9 plan that will yield increased benefits to the
community in the form of increased property tax, sales tax revenue, and
more employment opportunities.' 0
Kelo should be evaluated in light of two contemporary guideposts.
The first guidepost is the abiding economic reality of many "desperate"
cities and states."l Over the past two decades, many cities have seen
their economic bases contract, resulting from a loss of higher-income
taxpayers and an increase in the number of lower-income residents who
have a higher demand for city services. 12 Indeed, cities run on the "life-
blood" of property and sales tax revenues. 13
This reality was dramatically reflected in the Kelo case itself, as the
city of New London was thought of as an "economically distressed"
city. 14 City leaders in New London were desperate to raise additional
revenues after the federal government closed the doors of the Naval Un-
dersea Warfare Center in 1996, resulting in a loss of over 1500 jobs.' 5 In
Stat. 2396, 2494-95 (2005). Furthermore, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed
H.R. 4128, a bill that proposes to prevent states and their political subdivisions from receiving
federal economic development funds for two years if a court of competent jurisdiction rules
that eminent domain has been used for economic development. Private Property Rights Protec-
tion Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (as passed by House, Nov. 4, 2005). The
same legislation allows not only for individuals to sue local or federal government to enforce
any provision of the proposed law, but also for the awarding of attorney's fees should a plain-
tiff prevail. Id. § 4(a), (c). It also prevents the federal government from using eminent domain
for economic development. Id. § 3. The proposed law broadly defines economic development
as "taking private property, without the consent of the owner, and conveying or leasing such
property from one private person or entity to another private person or entity for commercial
enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general
economic health." Id. § 8(1).
7 Rachel A. Lewis, Note, Strike That, Reverse It: County of Wayne v. Hathcock:
Michigan Redefines Implementing Economic Development Through Eminent Domain, 50
VILL. L. REV. 341, 342-43 (2005).
8 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2666-67 (2005).
9 Id. at 2668.
10 See id. at 2665.
11 MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, BROOKINGS INST., DEALING WITH NEIGHBOR-
HOOD CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION AND POLICY CHOICES 19 (2001), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/gentrification/gentrification.pdf.
12 Id. at 17.
13 Id.
14 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004).
15 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
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1998, New London's unemployment rate was almost twice that of Con-
necticut's, prompting concern from civic and state leaders and spurring
the plan for the development of the Fort Trumbull area at issue in Kelo. 16
However, Fort Trumbull is an area located on the waterfront of New
London, a feature of its location that had attracted Pfizer Inc. to build a
$300 million research facility on land adjacent to the neighborhood.17 It
is estimated that the development and construction of the Pfizer facility
has resulted in 2000 additional, mostly high-paying, jobs to the area. 18
The other guidepost in the contemporary context in which Kelo
should be examined is the phenomenon, dating from the 1990's, of the
revitalization of many previously forgotten and decrepit inner city and
downtown areas. 19 "Urban revitalization," also known as "urban rede-
velopment" or "gentrification," is "the process of neighborhood change
that results in the replacement of lower income residents with higher in-
come ones."' 20 In an attempt to rejuvenate tax revenues and neighbor-
hoods and ultimately to bring life back to their downtown areas, the
reasons stated by the city of New London in Kelo, a new cadre of mayors
and other city leaders have placed attracting higher-income residents to
the inner cities and downtowns at the top of their municipal agendas. 21
Municipal leaders' efforts have been aided by the fact that many down-
towns have a large number of attractive features to future residents, in-
cluding unique architecture, the availability of land parcels along
waterfronts, cultural and arts scenes, easy access to health care, universi-
ties, colleges, and jobs. 22
This contemporary model of urban redevelopment is in direct con-
trast to the model of the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's, when urban redevel-
opment was initiated and pursued almost exclusively by the
government. 23 Urban redevelopment efforts diminished in the 1970's
16 Id. at 2658-59.
17 Id.
18 Id.; see also Ted Mann, Pfizer's Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct.
16, 2005, at Al. The benefit to attracting high-paying jobs is the prospect of additional sales
and income tax revenue to the city and state governments.
19 Cities in which urban redevelopment is taking place at an accelerated rate include San
Francisco, Boston, Seattle, Chicago, Portland, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Denver, Cleveland,
and Detroit. See KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 11, at 1-2; see also EUGENIE L. BIRCH,
THE BROOKINGS INST., WHO LIVES DOWNTOWN 1 (2005), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051115_Birch.pdf (stating that "during the 1990s, down-
town population grew by 10 percent, a marked resurgence following 20 years of overall
decline.").
20 See KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 11, at 1.
21 Id.
22 See BIRCH, supra note 19, at 1.
23 At its inception, urban renewal was heavily pursued by mayors of cities who wished to
compete with the suburbs and revitalize the inner cities. In order to achieve this goal, mayors
sought funding for their initiatives from the federal government. Business coalitions took a
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and 1980's, only to be resurrected in the 1990's through a new model
that involved public and private partnerships, with heavy emphasis on
the private.
In the context of this contemporary model of eminent domain, it is
imperative that a new analytical framework be used to examine takings
for economic development. The framework of Kelo fails to take into
account the current wave of urban development and the effects that this
phenomenon is having on ordinary citizens 24 who live in areas targeted
for urban redevelopment, but who lack the requisite political connections
to prevent their home or small business from being seized. History un-
derscores the notion that powerful private interests often dictate the terms
of economic development and, ultimately, the use of eminent domain for
revitalization projects.
Accordingly, this Article advocates a new framework that empow-
ers the average homeowner or small business owner who faces eminent
domain as part of an economic development project, but who lacks the
political power to influence or to halt such an undertaking. Part H exam-
ines the Kelo opinion. Part III examines the historical inequities in
power between large corporate interests and average citizens in eco-
nomic development takings and the attendant economic and political
subsidies in favor of large corporate interests at the expense of the home
and small business owner, using Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City
of Detroit 25 as a backdrop. Part IV explores reasons for a new analytical
framework using contemporary and past examples of economic develop-
ment takings, introduces a new framework, and proposes additional solu-
tions that may benefit all parties to a taking. Part V concludes in favor of
applying to the eminent domain area a process similar to that adopted in
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), with an emphasis on
Social Capital Impact Assessments (SCIAs).
By asking a series of questions regarding the effect of an economic
development taking on a community, SCIAs mandate that government
meaningfully address a community's concerns about the proposed tak-
ing. Similar to judicial review under NEPA, judicial review of SCIAs
would ensure a process rather than a particular outcome. As with NEPA,
direct hand in helping mayors push legislation through Congress, each time requiring more and
more federal funds. Over time the funding for renewal projects came not from federal funds,
but from private interests as these interests realized the potential for profit of their investments.
BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC. How AMERICA REBUILDS CIT-
IES 22-33 (1989).
24 For purposes of this article, reference to the "average citizen," "average resident," or
"average American" is not exclusive to persons in the United States having citizenship or
permanent residency, but instead these references are inclusive of landowners living and own-
ing real property in the United States, whether for their home, business, or investment pur-
poses, regardless of their citizenship or residency status.
25 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
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the hope would be that a more transparent process would provide addi-
tional opportunities for community members to influence the decision-
making outcomes for proposed economic development takings.
I. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE MAIN TENETS OF KELO
Kelo radically changed the landscape of eminent domain law by up-
holding general economic development as a "public use" under the Fifth
Amendment, although this development may benefit private parties di-
rectly, notwithstanding the public benefits of increased tax revenues and
more jobs. In Kelo, the Supreme Court majority relied heavily on Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff2 6 and Berman v. Parker.2 7 In Midkiff,
the Supreme Court upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause a
state statute authorizing eminent domain for the transfer of title to real
property from owners to renters as a way to break up the oligarchic con-
centration of land ownership in Hawaii and to infuse normal market con-
ditions in the real estate market in Hawaii. In Berman, the Court
similarly upheld the constitutionality of a law that authorized Congress to
use eminent domain and to transfer land to private developers because of
a "balanced, integrated [redevelopment] plan" 28 that existed to clear the
targeted area of slums and blight. In Congress' estimation, there was a
threat to the "public health, safety, and morals" '2 9 of the residents as a
result of the substandard housing and lack of adequate sanitation
facilities.
In the majority opinion of Kelo, Justice Stevens noted that there is a
single overarching requirement for an economic development taking to
pass muster under the Fifth Amendment: the provision of an "inte-
grated,"30 "comprehensive," 3' or "carefully considered" 32 economic de-
velopment plan. The Court first made several references to this
"balanced, integrated plan"33 requirement in Berman. It appears that the
Kelo Court has now firmly established this requirement, by consistently
mentioning this type of plan throughout the opinion as the primary requi-
site for an economic development taking to be constitutional. 34 Moreo-
ver, although in Berman the Court attempted to outline the contours of a
"balanced, integrated plan" by noting that it would have to include "new
26 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
27 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28 467 U.S. at 34.
29 348 U.S. at 28.
30 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 (2005).
31 Id. at 2668.
32 Id. at 2661.
33 Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n.13 (referencing the
"balanced, and integrated" plan in Berman).
34 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2559, 2665-68.
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homes, schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers," in the
hope that the plan would halt the "cycle of decay" of slum-ridden neigh-
borhoods, the Kelo Court failed to allude to or to require such specific
qualifications. 35 Indeed, without defining any terms, the most specific
delineation of an integrated or comprehensive development plan that
Kelo gives is one that will "provide appreciable benefits to the commu-
nity," such as additional jobs and tax revenue, as well as the hope that a
city's plan will "coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and rec-
reational uses of land,"' 36 such that the plan "will form a whole greater
than the sum of its parts. ' 37 In addition, the Court specifically declined
to review the effectiveness of the economic development plan put for-
ward by the city of New London.38
Outside of suggesting an almost exact replica of the economic plan
for the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, Kelo provides little guidance as to
how a constitutional economic development plan would amount to an
unconstitutional taking. Not only does this lack of clarity provide little
comfort to ordinary citizens whose property may be subject to takings,
however amorphous or ineffective the plan may be, but the opaqueness
of Kelo, with respect to constitutional criteria for an economic develop-
ment plan, also opens the door wide to potential abuse of citizens by
powerful institutional forces.
A second noteworthy element of the Kelo decision is that the Court
re-affirmed the Court's precedent, from Midkiff, that the standard of re-
view for takings statutes is rational basis.39 Under the rational basis test,
courts examine whether the State is using a rational means to achieve a
legitimate purpose.40 Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence
to Kelo that the rational basis test is likely the only basis on which the
Court should review the majority of takings statutes, outside of an exami-
nation by the Court to determine whether a taking is "intended to confer
benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental
or pretextual public benefits. '41
35 See id. at 2665-68.
36 Id. at 2559. The development plan included seven parcels of land, each of which was
to be designated for a conference hotel that was to be located at the center of restaurants and
shopping, a recreational and commercial marina, a river walk, residences, office space, support
facilities for the nearby state park, the marina, and shopping, respectively. Id.
37 Id. at 2665.
38 Id. at 2668.
39 See id. at 2667.
40 See id. (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-43).
41 Id. at 2669. Justice Kennedy, however, also noted that there may be some instances in
which eminent domain has been used to promote economic development in which a height-
ened standard of review is warranted, but he declined to specify those instances. Id. at 2670.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence only reinforces the problems in the majority opinion, especially
with respect to the amount of influence large private interests may have on a particular eco-
nomic development project. See infra Parts II.A-B.
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The most important element of Kelo, however, is the Court's ex-
press and extreme deference to state and federal legislatures on the issue
of whether or not eminent domain should be used for purposes of eco-
nomic development. Indeed, the Court underscored the legislative defer-
ence exhibited in Berman by leaving to the legislative branch questions
of what and how much land should be included in an economic redevel-
opment plan, including where the boundaries should lie for a project, and
whether or not a plan is actually effective in practice.42 The Court seem-
ingly empathized with those experiencing the "hardship" 43 of eminent
domain by counseling them to avail themselves of the legislative process.
Practically, though, the Court's advice amounted to suggesting that con-
cerned citizens lobby state legislative representatives for laws that would
restrict a state's authorization of eminent domain power for economic
development. 4
A. A LINE IN THE SAND - WHAT THE KELO MAJORITY REFUSED TO
Do
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Kelo explicitly rejected three
arguments advanced by the Petitioners in support of their contention that
the Connecticut law at issue in Kelo was unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment.
First, the Petitioners argued for a bright-line rule that would "stop a
city from transferring citizen A's property to citizen B for the sole reason
that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay
more taxes."' 45 The Court declined to adopt this bright-line rule, noting
that it would artificially restrict what governments can and cannot do
under the Public Use Clause.46
42 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 ("It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the
boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of
the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the
project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion
of the legislative branch.") (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36).
43 Id.
44 See id. ("We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose
'public use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these require-
ments have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are expressed
in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be
exercised."); see also Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent
Domain for Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1867-70 (2005) ("When
landowners are unhappy with the land use decisions being made by the legislature on their
behalf, they are free to elect new representatives or to vote with their feet by moving to a new
locality with land use laws that they prefer.").
45 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67 (emphasis added).
46 See id.
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Second, the Court refused to evaluate the economic development
plan under which eminent domain was exercised by the city of New
London, either for its proposed effectiveness in securing the public bene-
fits of higher tax revenue and increased jobs, or by New London's deter-
minations regarding the lands needed for the plan. 47
Third, and in connection with the second point, the Court explicitly
rejected the Petitioners' request to review the Connecticut legislature's
judgment of the need for a plan of economic revitalization to satisfy cer-
tain public needs for the city of New London.48 The Court reasoned that
precedent, dating from Berman, bound it to respect the decisions of the
legislative branch of Connecticut. 49
The majority opinion determined that precedent did not mandate
that the taking result in a direct benefit to the public, but only that there
be some benefit to the public, even if the land acquired by a taking may
be transferred to private hands. 50 The majority opinion adopted an atten-
uated, if not theoretical, notion of public benefit. For instance, in Kelo,
the takings did not result in any direct benefit to the community, as the
homes themselves were well maintained and there was no oligarchy of
land ownership. 5' Instead, the viability of the plan rested entirely upon
the mere hope that increased revenues, jobs, and civic momentum would
result and produce indirect public benefit for the city. The majority thus
upheld the hope of indirect public benefits as sufficient grounds for an
economic development taking.
B. THE KELo DISSENT
Although the Kelo majority relied on Midkiff and Berman to under-
gird its decision, Justice O'Connor's dissent distinguished these cases by
noting that the takings, though transferred to private hands, were miti-
gated by the fact that the public in each case was to benefit directly from
the use of eminent domain-by alleviating an oppressive condition to the
public.52 For instance, in Midkiff, the direct benefit to the public was the
dismantling of an oligarchic system of land ownership that resulted in a
skewed real property market in Hawaii. 53 Similarly, in Berman, the tak-
ings directly benefited the public by clearing an area of slums in Wash-
47 See id. at 2668.
48 See id. at 2664.
49 See id. at 2668.
50 See id. at 2666-68.
51 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting in Midkiff the "oligop-
oly resulting from extreme wealth" and stating that "[h]ere, in contrast, New London does not
claim that Susette Kelo's and Wilhelmina Dery's well-maintained homes are the source of any
social harm.").
52 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53 467 U.S. at 232.
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ington, D.C. that was a menace to public health and safety.54 In contrast,
in Kelo, there was no equivalent "social harm" that the taking
remedied. 55
Justice O'Connor subsequently identifies three categories of takings
that the Court had historically found to conform to the requirements of
the Public Use Clause. The first category is one in which the govern-
ment may convey private property that it has acquired through eminent
domain to "public ownership" for "a road, a hospital, or a military
base." 56 The second category includes the government's transferring of
private property acquired through a taking to private parties, "often com-
mon carriers, who make the property available for the public's use-such
as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium. '57 The third category
includes instances, existing under "certain circumstances" and meeting
"certain exigencies," for which "public ownership" under the first cate-
gory and "use-by-the-public" under the second category, are unworkable
under the Public Use Clause. 58 According to Justice O'Connor, until
Kelo, only Berman and Midkiff had met the requirements of this third
category because the pre-condemnation uses of the targeted land in those
cases were ones that "inflicted affirmative harm on society." '59
Reflecting the concerns that the Michigan Supreme Court noted in
County of Wayne v. Hathcock,60 in which it presciently disavowed the
reasoning set forth by the majority in Kelo, Justice O'Connor addition-
ally wrote that, in the sphere of economic development, private and tan-
gential public benefit are fused and are "mutually reinforcing.' '61
Regardless of the motive behind an economic development taking, it
would be difficult to "disaggregate" Pfizer's or the developer's private
economic benefit from any promised public benefits of increases in jobs
or tax revenues in Kelo.62
54 348 U.S. 26, 28.
55 125 S Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In response, the majority opinion of
Kelo noted that Justice O'Connor's dissent confused the "purpose of a taking with its mechan-
ics." Id. at 2666 n.16. The majority opinion observed that Justice O'Connor, in her dissent,
failed to follow precedent by interpreting the notion that there had to be a social harm before
property could be taken and transferred to a private party. Instead, the majority countered that
it is "future use" of a taking that is relevant to the public purpose test, and that just because the
mechanics of a situation entail a private party securing title to land, a public purpose may still
be achieved, presumably in the form of increased tax revenues and jobs. See id.
56 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Lewis, supra
note 7, at 364-70 (identifying three categories of "public use").
57 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
58 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 2673-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60 684 N.W. 2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
6t 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62 Id.
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Another limitation that Justice O'Connor found in the majority
opinion is that the government's choice to use eminent domain for eco-
nomic development put it in the business of "upgrading" real property.
For example, under Kelo, the government now has additional incentives
to take property on behalf of a private owner who intends to put it to
more profitable use, not only for the landowner herself, but also for the
state. As the landowner's profit increases, this profit may be passed
along to the state in the form of higher property, sales, and income tax
revenue.
63
In analyzing the majority opinion, Justice Thomas reiterated Justice
O'Connor's criticism of the majority opinion, noting that the Kelo hold-
ing in that it has by its decision created an illusory test that essentially
ignores the motive for the economic development. Justice Thomas, went
several steps further by advocating for a strict interpretation of the Public
Use Clause. Under this strict interpretation, the government may take
private property only if it will use it, or if the public has a legal right to
use the land. 64 Justice Thomas also wrote that the majority opinion had
effectively rendered meaningless the Public Use Clause by sanctioning
even economic development as a proper public use.65
Finally, Justice Thomas admonished the majority for failing to inter-
vene where the consequences of inaction would ultimately "fall dispro-
portionately on poor communities [that] are not only systematically less
likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the
least politically powerful." 66 Sadly, the history of the United States illus-
trates that, more often than not, when eminent domain has been used to
re-develop communities, the "leasts" in society are predominantly low-
income individuals, racial minorities, and the elderly. 67
63 Id. ("Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton,
any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.").
64 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2681-83.
65 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If such 'economic development' takings are for
a 'public use,' any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our
Constitution.").
66 Id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 2787. See generally Wendell H. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight:
Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. I (2003)
(examining the legal history of the urban renewal program and its impact on the Public Use
Clause); DANA BERLINER, THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A NEW
RESOURCE FOR FIGHTING EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 185 (2003), available at http//
:www.castlecoalition.org/publications/report/index.html (documenting the actual or threatened
condemnation of more than 10,000 properties in forty-one states between 1998 and 2002).
2006]
198 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:187
II. ADVANTAGING CORPORATIONS: KELO ANALYZED AND
APPLIED TO CURRENT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
The arguments advanced by the Kelo dissent are ultimately more
convincing, more grounded in reality, and, ultimately, more just. The
majority's refusal to hold in favor of the Petitioners reflects a view of
American democracy that is woefully out-of-step with current realities of
the legislative process in many states. Modem legislative process in-
cludes representatives who are largely elected and supported from dona-
tions made by large and powerful corporate interests. 68 The majority's
view of state legislative process is particularly outdated, given the two
important guideposts influencing the contemporary urban planning envi-
ronment:69 1) "desperate" cities that are in dire need, or believe they are
in great need, of additional tax revenues that make up the lifeblood of
their communities; and 2) the current explosion of what might be termed,
"Downtown, Inc.," the strategy of securing additional tax revenues by
attracting higher-income individuals to live, work, and play in previ-
ously neglected, but culturally and historically rich inner-city cores. The
effect of this current environment is to displace lower-income residents
who can no longer afford to live in these redeveloped areas.
A. EXTREME INFLUENCE
In the context of this model of urban redevelopment, it is often large
corporate interests with powerful political connections that are the "un-
mistakable guiding and sustaining hand, indeed [the] controlling hand" 70
behind the government's use of eminent domain for economic develop-
ment. Several characteristics common among urban centers undergoing
redevelopment lead to extensive corporate involvement.
First, economically "desperate" cities, such as New London, face an
economic drain and do not have the leverage to negotiate terms of these
economic development projects to preserve long-standing communities
or small businesses. City and state negotiating leverage is markedly di-
minished by a corporate threat, veiled or unveiled, to locate development
and attendant promises of increased real estate, sales, and income tax
revenue and jobs to a more accommodating locale. Second, this "desper-
ate" environment in tandem with the revitalization explosion of many of
68 See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1867-68 (supporting the notion that the legisla-
ture is the primary forum for economic development takings and that should landowners disa-
gree with takings laws "they are free to elect new representatives or to vote with their feet by
moving to a new locality with land use laws that they prefer.") (citation omitted).
69 See supra Part I.
70 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 468 (1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
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America's inner cities, presents a strategic advantage decidedly in favor
of large corporations or other large private interests.
This notion of the powerful "sustaining hand" of large corporate
interests at the local or state level is grounded in American political the-
ory. 71 There is an inverse relationship between the size of the unit of the
government and the risk of the abuse of power.72 As the government
unit decreases in jurisdiction, from national to local scope, the risk of
abuse of power increases.73 For this reason, several courts and commen-
tators have called for the abolition of the doctrine of separation of powers
with respect to land use decisions by municipalities. 74
B. INCREASED RISK OF ABUSE OF POWER
Several arguments have been advanced in support of the notion that
there is an increased risk of abuse of power at the local level.75  One
contention is that municipal development corporations, such as the New
London Development Corporation that was the condemning authority in
Kelo, lack objectivity because they invest substantial "time, expertise,
and money in designing public projects. '76 There is a vested interest on
the part of these economic development corporations for the drawn-up
plans to succeed. Furthermore, outside of the judicial system, there is
generally no authority that impartially reviews the plans and decisions of
municipal development corporations. 77 A second contention is that at a
more basic level, precisely because of the "desperate" situation in which
local officials often find their communities, large-scale private interests
and their associates, such as large corporations, developers, and real es-
tate interests simply overpower the local officials.78
Additionally, at the state levels, cities and the "sustaining hand" of
large corporate interests curry political favor with state legislators, often
seeking eminent domain statutes that favor the use of economic develop-
71 See Laura Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent
Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 432 (1983).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 433 (citing Fasano v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973)), overruled on
other grounds, Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980), which overruled a
zoning board's decision to approve a developer's plan to rezone an area because "zoning deci-
sions by local governing bodies" are not all "legislative acts to be ... shielded from less than
constitutional scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers," and equating a taking to be
"quasi-judicial in nature" that "militates against a presumption of validity when a court hears a
constitutional challenge.") (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, The Rights of Property, in 2 A COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 241-42 (1965)).
75 Id. at 433-35.
76 Id. at 434.
77 Id. (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §10-8, at 513-14
(1st ed. 1978)).
78 See id. at 435 (citation omitted).
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ment takings to the exclusion and expense of the average citizen and
taxpayer. Judge Posner 79 explains this sort of behavior by arguing that
all people "in all of their activities" are "rational maximizers of their
satisfactions, including the "legislator deciding whether to vote for or
against a bill." °8 0 The public interest may not consistently motivate legis-
lators, but their desire to be elected or re-elected does. 81 Money is often
a critical tool for pursuing a campaign to secure the election or re-elec-
tion of legislators, and is "more likely" to come from "well-organized
groups than from unorganized individuals. 82
Judge Posner further elaborates:
The rational individual knows that his contribution is un-
likely to make a difference; for this reason and also be-
cause voters in most elections are voting for candidates
rather than policies, which further weakens the link be-
tween casting one's vote and obtaining one's preferred
policy, the rational individual will have little incentive to
invest time and effort in deciding whom to vote for.
Only an organized group of individuals (or firms or
other organizations-but these are conduits for individu-
als) will be able to overcome the informational and free-
rider problems that plague collective action. But such a
group will not organize and act effectively unless its
members have much to gain or much to lose from spe-
cific policies, as tobacco farmers, for example, have
much to gain from federal subsidies from growing to-
bacco and much to lose from the withdrawal of those
subsidies. The basic tactic of an interest group is to
trade the votes of its members and its financial support
79 Judge Richard A. Posner sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and
he has written a number of books and authored countless law review articles. In Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Lady Baltimore Foods, 960 F.2d 1339
(1992), Judge Posner, writing for the majority regarding tax legislation, similarly noted that
"[m]uch modem legislation involves targeting government largesse on politically influential
groups and the burdens of government on politically impotent ones. Not infrequently the
legislation benefits a tiny handful of individuals or firms or even a single firm .. "
80 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS WITH JURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990) (emphasis
omitted).
81 Id. at 354.
82 Id.; see also Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Eco-
nomic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1016
(2004) (stating that "[1]ittle prevents municipalities and private interests from abusing the sys-
tem. Both corporate interests and political leaders dependent on their support have tremen-
dous incentives to overestimate the economic benefits of projects furthered by
condemnation.") (emphasis added).
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to candidates in exchange for an implied promise of
favorable legislation.8 3
Posner's reasoning would clearly lead to the conclusion that most
plaintiffs who seek to defeat economic development takings would be
individual homeowners. That the nine petitioners in Kelo and the mem-
bers of the Poletown Neighborhood Council in Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit 84 were individual homeowners would seem to
help confirm Posner's theory of the use of interest group politics to com-
bat the rational apathy of individual voters.
Posner's theory, however, is seemingly contradicted by the over-
whelming legislative response to Kelo, which has largely been in favor of
the average citizen and against large corporate interests and government.
For instance, after the Kelo decision, while only five states actually en-
acted legislation that placed restrictions on economic development tak-
ings in 2005, almost every state to date is considering proposing this type
of legislation.8 5
Of course, no sweeping conclusions should be drawn from this
surge of reform proposals, since there is a wide gap between a legislative
proposal and the actual promulgation of legislation. Nonetheless, one
way to explain this divergence from ordinary legislative practice in favor
of corporate interests is that the reaction to the Kelo decision was in itself
extraordinary. The reaction, likely a result of extremely effective public-
ity measures taken by the Petitioners in Kelo and their counsel, erupted
from a nationwide groundswell of public opinion, yielding a tremendous,
organized, and concentrated response to the decision. The fact that the
U.S. Supreme Court acted on eminent domain for economic development
83 POSNER, supra note 80, at 354; see also Somin, supra note 82, at 1015 (noting that
there is an "unjustified faith" in the political process and emphasizing that the process cur-
rently justifies less deference by the courts); see also Ilya Somin, Posner's Democratic Prag-
matism, 16 CRITICAL REV. 1 (2004) (echoing Posner's arguments regarding how interest
groups are able to take advantage of the political process, and arguing for increased judicial
review).
84 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take statute that allowed
the city of Detroit to take land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General
Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto plant because the public benefits promised by
the plant were substantial); see also infra Part IH.(D).
85 The National Conference of State Legislatures has placed this reactionary legislation
into the following five categories: (1) categorically limiting takings for "economic develop-
ment, enhancing tax revenue or transferring private property to another private entity (or pri-
marily for those purposes); (2) defining what constitutes public use; (3) establishing additional
criteria for designating blighted areas subject to eminent domain; (4) strengthening public no-
tice, public hearing and landowner negotiation criteria, and requiring local government ap-
proval before condemning property; and (5) placing a moratorium on the use of eminent
domain for a specified time period and establishing a task force to study the issue and report
findings to the legislature." National Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain,
available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/EMINDOMAIN.htm.
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purposes, as opposed to a state legislature, municipality, or a state court,
also likely attracted an inordinate amount of publicity to eminent domain
takings on a macro level.
This situation, combined with the Supreme Court's strong inference
in Kelo that contentious issues involved in economic development tak-
ings were best solved by state legislatures, consequently spurred a strong
and extraordinary trickle-down response to the opinion by state legisla-
tures. However, most legislation whether or not it concerns eminent do-
main in the ordinary course, does not result in the Kelo-type federal case.
Any media attention garnered relating to typical eminent domain legisla-
tion is concentrated at a local level, leaving in place many of the tradi-
tional power structures that affect legislation, such as powerful private
interests.
Nevertheless, groups that must stand against city and corporate gi-
ants are often too small and have too little time to organize effectively
before a plan or action is taken to seize their property. 86 Their resolve to
organize might erode as the result of inner turmoil created by some land-
owners supporting the economic development out of economic self-inter-
est. For instance, the Poletown Neighborhood Council in Poletown
suffered from this fate; it failed to unite the Polish-American community
in Detroit because many residents believed that they would benefit from
the new Cadillac plant by having additional job opportunities. 87 Moreo-
ver, the Poletown Neighborhood Council failed to gain the support of
Poletown's African-American residents, many of whom pointed out that
in previous urban re-development projects, Polish-American residents of
other neighborhoods failed to support them and many "knew a good [ec-
onomic] deal when they saw one."'88
86 But see Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1868 (refuting the notion that landowners may
organize effectively because economic development projects often involve assembling numer-
ous parcels of land in close proximity to one another, owned by different landowners who are
bound to be displaced by the project, thus strengthening the bonds that would facilitate land-
owners' stance as a united group in opposition to the takings).
87 See BRYAN D. JONES & LYNN W. BACHELOR, THE SUSTAINING HAND 155 (1986). But
see Gallagher, supra note 44, at 1868 (discussing how residents in Poletown banded together
to form the Poletown Neighborhood Council to contest the takings, and noting that in Kelo
property owners who opposed the takings organized to file a lawsuit). There were only nine
Kelo landowners who filed suit, thus minimizing the effect that the group may have had,
regardless of how tightly organized it was, given its small numbers. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at
2660.
88 See JONES & BACHELOR, supra note 87; see also Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 471 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting that the commu-
nity-at-large failed to mobilize behind the Poletown Neighborhood Council because of "[t]he
promise of new tax revenues, retention of a mighty GM manufacturing facility in the heart of
Detroit, new opportunities for satellite businesses, retention of 6,000 or more jobs, and con-
comitant reduction of unemployment, all fostered a comrunity-wide chorus of support for the
project.").
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In addition, the short amount of time that accompanies many eco-
nomic development takings, like in Poletown under Michigan's quick-
take statute, dictates that opposition community groups will usually be
short-term ventures. By contrast, large private interests know there is
some degree of permanence in their endeavors. They, therefore, form
politically effective interest groups to influence politicians. Homeown-
ers and small businesspersons faced with economic development takings
often see no reason to form a lasting alliance between themselves or
others. 89
The average citizen not only lacks the requisite political power to
stop economic development takings legislation at the state level or the
actual taking at the municipal level, but also finds little practical recourse
in the courts. Most average Americans faced with the prospect of losing
their home or small business simply cannot afford to continue litigation
until the exhaustion of all appeals, let alone mount a lawsuit contesting
the eminent domain taking against well-financed and organized munici-
pal and state legal offices.90 As an exception that proves the rule, the
homeowners in Kelo were able to mount and press their judicial attack to
the highest level of the judicial system, but only because they were repre-
sented by the Institute for Justice, a non-profit law firm.9'
C. ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES
Perversely, the citizen from whom the government takes a home or
small business pays twice in the bargain, a type of "double taxation" for
the privilege of having his or her property taken. The first time a land-
owner is "taxed" is through the seizure of his or her house or livelihood.
The second time is through tax dollars that often pay to subsidize the
economic development behind which already-wealthy corporate interests
are the "sustaining hand." This second level of "taxation" in economic
development takings comes in the form of tax dollars spent to purchase
the land under eminent domain, bonds, or other debt issued that the local,
state and federal levels of government must service to pay for the
purchase of the land. An added third level of "taxation" conceivably
falls upon the rare landowner willing to pay attorney's fees and court
costs to seek recourse in the judicial system.
89 Mansnerus, supra note 71, at 436.
90 See Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings
Clause and the Erosion of the "Public Use" Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543, 573 (2002)
("Private landowners are at a disadvantage fighting against cities with vast taxpayer revenues
to pay good attorneys and to appeal rulings. If a single private landowner's property is taken,
she may not have the money to challenge the city's action in court.").
91 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
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Furthermore, large corporate interests are economically subsidized
by avoiding competitive real estate market bidding.92 This subsidy, in
combination with the first and second levels of taxation on ordinary citi-
zens, results in those with the most resources benefiting economically at
the expense of those with the least economic means. The most desperate
cities, with the fewest alternative options available, must pay the most in
subsidies to attract large corporate interests, and the wealthiest corpora-
tions end up receiving the largest concessions.93
D. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF: POLETOWN REDUX
Judge Ryan, one of the dissenting judges in the 1981 Michigan Su-
preme Court Poletown case, sagely predicted, "the reverberating clang of
[Poletown's] economic, sociological, political, and jurisprudential impact
is likely to be heard and felt for generations. '94 The Poletown clang has
now been eclipsed by the sonic boom of the Supreme Court's decision in
Kelo, a decision almost twenty-five years later that parallels Poletown,
but the effects of which will ultimately be more far-reaching and likely
longer lasting.
Poletown upheld a Michigan "quick-take" statute that authorized
municipalities to use eminent domain for economic development. In
practice, this quick-take statute95 allowed the city of Detroit to take
Poletown, a historic neighborhood composed primarily of 3,438 elderly
lower-class Polish- and African-American residents, for General Motors
(GM) construction of a new $500 million dollar Cadillac plant.96 The
plant was to cost local, state, and federal taxpayers, nearly $200,000,000
but GM and Detroit promised 6150 auto-manufacturing jobs and $15
million in property tax revenues. 97
92 Kruckeberg, supra note 90, at 579 (2002) (discussing the notion that corporations
should be prevented from having to go "outside of the open market.").
93 John J. Bukowczyk, The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs.
G.M. and the City of Detroit, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 70 (1984) (quoting JONES AND
BACHELOR, supra note 87, at 48) (". . . those cities most in need of increased revenues are
likely to make the greatest overpayments, and those corporations with the greatest profit mar-
gins are likely to receive the largest surpluses from them.").
94 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464-65 (1981) (Ryan,
J., dissenting).
95 The "quick-take" statute allowed for faster takings, "making the process easier for
both the condemning authority and the ultimate owner." Mansnerus, supra note 71, at 435; see
also Rocco C. Nunzio, Note, Eminent Domain: Private Corporations and the Public Use
Limitation, II U. BALT. L. REV. 310, 319 & n. 89 (1982), and Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455 at
461 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
96 Bukowczyk, supra note 93, at 61.
97 Id. at 464 n.15, 467; see also JONES & BACHELOR, supra note 87, at 138-39; JEANIE
WYLIE, POLErOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 52 (1989) (noting that the social cost to the
Poletown takings was the clearance of 1400 homes, 144 businesses, and sixteen churches and
that estimates the actual cost to taxpayers was over $300,000,000); see also Somin, supra note
83, at 1017 (analyzing the social and economic costs to the taking of the Poletown neighbor-
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Like the city of New London in Kelo, Detroit made the case that it
was in dire economic straits. One of the dissenting opinions in Poletown
noted:
[w]hile unemployment is high throughout the nation; it
is of calamitous proportions throughout the state of
Michigan, and particularly in the City of Detroit, whose
economic lifeblood is the now foundering automobile in-
dustry. It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of this
crisis. Unemployment in the state of Michigan is 14.2%.
In the City of Detroit it is at 18%, and among black citi-
zens it is almost 30%.98
In both Poletown and Kelo, then, unemployment was the bait used
to lure judicial approval of economic development takings. Moreover,
like New London in Kelo, Detroit in Poletown justified the use of emi-
nent domain for the construction of a new GM plant by pointing to the
city's dismal economic statistics.99 Although the kind of economic de-
velopment pursued in each case differed, with Kelo having a large-scale
mixed commercial/residential project, and Poletown having the GM
manufacturing plant, both cases had similar intended benefits to the pub-
lic: the retention and creation of new jobs, more tax revenue, and spill-
off reconstruction into the community. In each instance, however, a
small group of average citizen residents who lacked political and eco-
nomic influence was pitted against the local government and powerful
private interests.
hood and arguing that with the closing of small businesses located in Poletown as a result of
the takings, Detroit actually suffered a net job loss and that the condemnation of the neighbor-
hood "did the people of Detroit more harm than good"); see also id. at 1018 (confirming that
$150 million of taxpayer money expended on the Poletown project came from federal loans
and grants and state taxpayer funds were responsible for $30 million of the budget); but cf.
Jenny Nolan, Auto Plant vs. Neighborhood: The Poletown Battle, DETROIT NEWS, available at
http://info.detnews.comlhistory/story/index.cfm?id=18&category=business (referencing a
study from University of Michigan that showed that "87% of the former Poletown residents
older than 60 and 84 percent of younger former residents were happy in their new homes.").
That most residents of Poletown were in time "happy" in their new neighborhoods, however,
bears no relevance to the issue of whether or not eminent domain should have been used to
construct the GM plant. Also, the psychological effects of forced relocation have been docu-
mented, noting that in one community 46% of adult females and 38% of adult males under-
went "a fairly severe grief reaction or worse." HERBERT J. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS:
GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS 379 (The Free Press, 2d ed. 1982); see
also Bukowczyk, supra note 93, at 62.
98 Poletown, 304 N.W. 2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
99 See id. at 459 ("In this regard the city presented substantial evidence of the severe
economic conditions facing the residents of the city and state, the need for new industrial
development to revitalize local industries, the economic boost the proposed project would
provide, and the lack of other adequate available sites to implement the project.").
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Yet another similarity between Poletown and Kelo is that the neigh-
borhoods did not suffer from blight, were not slums, and did not pose
any other hazard to the community. I°° Both neighborhoods, however,
did share one unfortunate trait that made them ripe for economic devel-
opment taking: they happened to be located in areas that large politically-
connected corporations, namely Pfizer and General Motors, wanted for
their own ends, regardless of the spill-over benefits to the community. In
the case of the Poletown community in Detroit, General Motors exer-
cised inordinate influence over the city's political elite. 10 Similarly, af-
ter searching for an appropriate site for its headquarters, Pfizer decided
on the economically depressed city of New London, Connecticut, ingrati-
ating itself to the local political leadership. 10 2
For instance, in his dissent in Poletown, Judge Ryan included corre-
spondence from GM to the Mayor of Detroit that detailed the extent to
which GM was involved in the destruction of Poletown. According to
the correspondence, GM conceived the project, dictated the site where
the Cadillac plant was to be built, stated the deadlines by which it was to
receive title to all of the land seized in Poletown, directed how costs
involved in clearing the site and making improvements to it were to be
allocated, and demanded twelve years of property tax abatements.10 3
Pfizer and New London may have absorbed the lessons of
Poletown, as there was no "smoking gun" correspondence that detailed
publicly the extent to which the parties were intertwined in the taking of
the petitioners' homes in Fort Trumbull. Nonetheless, it was clear to
Justice Thomas that the project, located adjacent to Pfizer's $300 million
newly-built research complex, 1°4 was "suspiciously agreeable to the Pfi-
zer Corporation."' 1 5 Indeed, in a review of documents dating from 1997
concerning the project, Pfizer, like GM, was involved from the plan's
inception, and it detailed a "vision" for the Fort Trumbull area that in-
volved replacing the neighborhood with upscale housing and office space
to mesh with the Pfizer campus. 10 6
An even more startling fact is that several former high-ranking state
officials confirmed that Pfizer demanded that Connecticut replace Fort
100 Mansnerus, supra note 71, at 418 (supporting the lack of blight and sub-standard con-
ditions in Poletown); Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674-75 (2005) (noting
that the Petitioners' homes in Kelo were "well-maintained" and yielded no kind of social ill).
101 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 465-69 (1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
102 Barry Yeoman, Whose House Is It Anyway?, AARP MAGAZINE ONLINE, (May/June
2005), at http://www.aarpmagazine.org/money/whose-houseisitanyway.html.
103 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 466-71 (1981) (Ryan,
J., dissenting).
104 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
105 Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106 See Mann, supra note 18, at A .
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Trumbull or else it would not build the multi-million dollar Pfizer facil-
ity. 10 7 The reason for this demand was, as one official noted, Pfizer
wanted to ensure that the PhD's it attracted to work in its adjacent re-
search complex, who would be making $150,000 to $200,000 annually,
would feel comfortable in the neighborhood and enjoy a high quality of
life.108 Indeed, the husband of a former president of the New London
Development Corporation, who was a Pfizer executive, was quoted in a
Connecticut newspaper stating, "Pfizer wants a nice place to operate.
We don't want to be surrounded by tenements."' 9
The cost to taxpayers for both Kelo and Poletown has been enor-
mous. In Poletown, the price tag to local, state, and federal taxpayers
was upwards of $200,000,000.' 0 The expense to taxpayers has been
similar in Kelo, where in addition to the $118,000,000 in financial incen-
tives that Connecticut and New London offered to Pfizer to build its fa-
cility, the state has spent an additional $73,000,000 from bonds for the
redevelopment of Fort Trumbull.I"
In spite of these massive costs to the taxpayer and the "sustaining
hand" of GM and Pfizer, both the Poletown and Kelo majorities justified
the takings of the neighborhoods by pointing to the public benefits to the
community that would result from the economic development projects:
the GM/Cadillac plant in Poletown and the large-scale, mixed-use rede-
velopment project in Kelo. 2 In neither case, however, did the courts
verify or inquire into whether these speculative public benefits would
likely occur. In the case of Poletown, the promise made by GM and
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Jane Ellen Dee, Oh, Claire You're a Scholar and a Visionary ... If Only You Could
Quit Leaving Skin on the Sidewalk, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at 5; see also Barry
Yeoman, Whose House Is It Anyway?, AARP MAGAZINE ONLINE, (May/June 2005), at http://
www.aarpmagazine.org/money/whose house-is-it-anyway.html. In addition, the building for
the more politically-connected Italian Dramatic Club was spared condemnation. Izaskun E.
Larrafieta, New London, Conn., Development Group Accused of Pushing Too Hard for Pfizer,
THE DAY, Aug. 14, 2001, at BI, available at INFOTRAC, Document No. CJ120922867. De-
spite these developments, Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurrence to Kelo that the trial court
had heard testimony from parties involved in the deal, examined correspondence between
them, but concluded that Pfizer was not the prime beneficiary of the plan. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at
2669-70. In addition, Justice Kennedy pointed out that even the justices on the Connecticut
Supreme Court that dissented had agreed that the plan was not "to serve the interests of Pfizer
... or any other private party." Id.
I 10 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 464 n.15 (1981) (Ryan,
J., dissenting).
111 Mann, supra note 18.
112 Kelo, 125, S. Ct. at 2664-65, Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
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Detroit was that "at least 6,000 jobs" were to be created by replacing the
neighborhood with a Cadillac plant. 113
The hoped-for public benefits of opening the GM plant never came.
The GM plant opened late." 4 In 1988, seven years after the condemna-
tion of the neighborhood, "no more than 2,500 workers"' 115 worked there.
Even in 1998, at the apex of the economic expansion of the 1990's, the
plant employed only 3,600 workers, a figure equivalent to less than 60%
of the 6,150 jobs initially promised." 16 In addition, with the closing of
small businesses located in Poletown, there is an argument that Detroit
actually suffered a net loss of jobs and that the condemnation of the
neighborhood "did the people of Detroit more harm than good."' "7
The current economic health of GM is reason enough to re-examine
Kelo. The impact of GM on Detroit also illustrates the futility of relying
on hope - or the illusory benefits of economic development as a pretext
to taking someone's home or business. For instance, because of GM's
decreased market share, which many attribute to the carmaker's inability
"to make cars that people want to buy," '" 8 GM announced in November
2005 that it was eliminating 30,000 jobs and fully and partially closing a
dozen plants."l 9 In addition, GM lost $8.6 billion in 2005, providing a
reason for the termination of 30,000 jobs.' 20
GM, however, is not alone in its economic woes in Detroit. All
three of Detroit's Big Three automakers, including Ford and Chrysler,
have eradicated or have plans to eradicate 86,000 jobs, or what amounts
to one-third of their work force in North America.' 2' Moreover, De-
troit's auto industry's bonds have been "downgraded to junk." 122
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed Poletown in County of
Wayne v. Hathcock,'23 only a year before the U.S. Supreme Court in
113 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 467-68 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing Mayor Coleman
Young's statement and referencing the correspondence from Thomas A. Murphy, Chairman of
the Board of General Motors to Mayor Young (Oct. 8, 1980)).
114 See JONES & BACHELOR, supra note 87, at 218.
115 Marie Michael, Detroit at 300: New Seeds of Hope for a Troubled City?, DOLLARS &
SENSE, Jul/Aug. 2001, at 25.
1t6 See id.
117 Somin, supra note 82, at 1017 (emphasis added).
18 Maryann N. Keller, Dull at Any Speed, WASH. POST., June 12, 2005, at B1.
19 Micheline Maynard & Vikas Bajaj, Ford to Cut Up to 30,000 Jobs and 14 Plants in
Next Six Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at Al.
120 Michael Ellis, Ex-GM Spokesman Returns, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 1, 2006, at 6F.
121 See Maynard & Bajaj, supra note 119, at Al.
122 Editorial Desk, Trying to Find the Road Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at A20; see
also Moody's Cuts G.M. 's Credit Rating Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at C 15 (noting that
Moody's Investors Service reduced the automaker's debt to B2 from B1, five levels beneath
investment grade, making it much more expensive for G.M. to borrow money and to improve
its profitability).
123 684 N.W. 2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004) ("Our decision today does not announce a new
rule of law, but rather returns our law to that which existed before Poletown ... ").
CORRECTING FOR KELO
Kelo seemingly "upheld" the decision in Poletown. Hathcock involved
the decision by Wayne County, which includes Detroit, to condemn
nineteen parcels of land for the construction of Pinnacle Project, a busi-
ness and technology park that was anticipated to create 30,000 jobs and
yield $350 million in new tax revenues for the county. 124 Wayne County
argued that Pinnacle Project would create jobs, expand the tax base, stem
population loss, decrease disinvestment in the community, and provide
fertile ground for additional re-development. 125 The Hathcock court ac-
knowledged that these public benefits were in harmony with the Michi-
gan statute under which eminent domain was exercised by the county,' 26
but ultimately ruled that basing the taking on these public benefits was
inconsistent with the Michigan Constitutional requirement that eminent
domain be exercised only for a "public use."'' 27 Like Justice Thomas in
Kelo, 128 the court further noted that almost every use of real property by
a business or "productive unit" benefits the community.1 29 According to
the court, to justify the use of eminent domain because a particular
profit-seeking private party would put the land to "better use," in the
form of more money to the public and more jobs to the community
removes the restrictions imposed on eminent domain by the Michigan
Constitution. 13 0
Thus far, the economic benefits of the takings promised in Kelo
have been just as illusory as those promised in Poletown. The public
outcry against the takings in Kelo left investors wary of building on land
that had become a symbol of eminent domain abuse and left the petition-
ers in Kelo so confident that they not only stayed in their houses, they
even renovated them for an extended time period after the Court ren-
dered its decision. 131 Moreover, "contract disputes and financial uncer-
124 Id. at 771.
125 id. at 775-76.
126 Id.; see also MICH. CoMP. LAWS 213.23 (1998) (stating that "any public corporation or
state agency is authorized to take private property necessary for a public improvement or for
the purposes of its incorporation or for public purposes within the scope of its powers for the
use or benefit of the public.").
127 MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (1963) (stating that "private property shall not be taken for
public use").
128 See supra note 65 and accompanying text regarding Justice Thomas' dissent.
129 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786.
130 Id. at 786-87. The Hathcock court also outlined three general categories, tracking the
criteria outlined in Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent, that fit within the Michigan Constitution's
"public use" limitation: 1) if there is a public necessity that warrants use of eminent domain,
including "instrumentalities of commerce" such as railroads, highways, and canals; 2) if the
eventual private owner of the property is subject to public accountability in the property's use;
and 3) if the condemnation itself is a public use, such as when slums or blight is eliminated.
See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-83; see also Lewis, supra note 7, at 367-68.
131 William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21 2005, at Al. In June 2006, however, New London voted, in opposition
to the stance taken by Connecticut's governor to evict the remaining hold-outs in Fort Trum-
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tainty" marred plans to construct in previously cleared areas of Fort
Trumbull.' 32 Indeed, after the decision, the Mayor of New London pub-
licly questioned the viability of the re-development of Fort Trumbull for
at least the next two years.' 33 As a result, under Kelo, even in times of
economic uncertainty, the average Joe is unable to stand on terra firma.
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK
A. CORPORATE INFLUENCE
The Supreme Court's failure to clearly define what sort of "compre-
hensive, integrated, or balanced" economic development plan would be
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment, combined with its position of
extreme deference to state legislatures, leaves the floodgates wide open
for abuse by large private interests that exert great influence on these
same state legislatures. These private interests are often the "sustaining
hand" behind many economic development takings. Furthermore, the
Court's refusal to require evidence from the government that the prom-
ised theoretical public benefits of takings in the form of increased jobs
and tax revenues will yield actual equivalent benefits to the community
further perpetuates the ability of corporate entities to enjoy the advan-
tages of their cozy relationships with legislators and municipal leaders to
the detriment of ordinary citizens.
Particular abuses of this kind can be seen in Poletown and in
Kelo,134 but the litany of abuses runs long.' 35 For instance, in 2001, a
federal district court in California granted plaintiff 99 Cents' motion for
summary judgment 3 6 after the city of Lancaster, California, had initiated
bull. See Avi Salzman. Connecticut City Takes First Step to Evict Eminent Domain Case,
N.Y. TimES, June 6, 2006, at B2. Furthermore, in July 2006, the city's Planning and Zoning
Commission granted building permits for the economic development project to begin. See
Elaine Stoll, Commission Approves Hotel Suite Plan For Fort Trumbull, THE DAY, July 22,
2006, at 2B.
132 Yardley, supra note 131, at Al.
133 Id. at B7 ("Winning took so long that the plan may not be as viable in 2005 or 2006 or
2007.").
134 See supra Part III.(D).
135 See generally Dana Berliner, supra note 67 (compiling records of condemnations or
threats of condemnations of more than 10,000 properties in forty-one states from 1998 to
2002). In his concurring opinion in Kelo, Justice Kennedy wrote that allegations of "imper-
missible favoritism to private parties" should be treated seriously by the courts, but that in
many cases, including Kelo, the record indicated no such preferences. 125 S. Ct. at 2669-70.
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a stricter test might be warranted for
instances where "the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties" is so
"acute" that a taking would be invalid under the Public Use Clause. Id. at 2670. However,
Justice Kennedy declined to hypothesize what sort of instances may warrant this stricter scru-
tiny. Id.
136 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp.2d 1123 (C.D. Cal.
June 26, 2001), affd, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003).
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condemnation proceedings on property in which a 99 Cents Only store
had a leasehold interest.137 Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco) had
previously demanded that it be allowed to expand its store on the space
occupied by 99 Cents. 138 Viewing Costco as an "anchor tenant" and
fearful of Costco's relocation to another city, Lancaster put forth a pro-
posal to expend $3.8 million of taxpayer money to purchase the leased
property from the owner, relocate 99 Cents at taxpayer expense, and sell
the property to Costco for $1.00, though there was no evidence that the
99 Cents store was blighted.1 39 To the court's credit, it halted this eco-
nomic development project that appeared to be tainted by Costco's cor-
porate influence.
Another contemporary example of the inordinate corporate influ-
ence on takings is exemplified in Southwestern Illinois Development Au-
thority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C. 140 In this case, an Illinois
court struck down a development authority's (SWIDA) exercise of emi-
nent domain on behalf of a private racetrack operator that needed more
parking. 14' Conveniently, the racetrack found it cheaper to petition the
government to take an adjacent landowner's property for ground parking,
instead of building a parking garage on its own property. 142 As a result
of the development authority's action, the racetrack's revenues were ex-
pected to increase to up to $14 million."43 The court also noted that
SWIDA, as an agent of the government, advertised that, for a fee, it
would condemn land "at the request of 'private developers' for the 'pri-
vate use' of developers."' 144
Yet another case in which a court has acted to counteract the expan-
sive influence of large corporate interests in economic development tak-
ings involved the condemnation of two small businesses and an elderly
woman's home by the New Jersey Casino Redevelopment Authority." 45
Trump Plaza Associates, owned by Donald Trump, had successfully peti-
tioned the Redevelopment Authority to condemn the landowners' proper-
ties in order to make way for casino expansion, including surface parking
137 id. at 1126.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1126-27.
140 768 N.E.2d 1 (I11. 2002) [hereinafter SWIDA].
141 Id. at 4.
142 Id. at 10. Previously, the racetrack operator benefited from the issuance of $21.5
million in revenue bonds by SWIDA that had been lent to the operator to finance the construc-
tion and development of the racetrack. Id. at 3.
143 Id. at 10.
144 Id. at 10, 12. The fee included a $2,500 application fee and a $10,000 down payment
to be applied to SWIDA's fee for taking the property. Other parts of the deal were the race-
track's agreement to pay for the price of the land and all other expenses that SWIDA incurred
in the acquisition.
145 See Casino Redevelopment Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 110 (N.J. Super. 1998).
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and open green space. 146 The New Jersey court held that the limousine
parking was a public use, but that the taking was simply a pretext for
giving Trump a "blank check", including the addition of more casino
space, without oversight by the government. 147 Here again, it was the
judicial branch that stepped in to check the imbalance of power in the
legislative and executive branches.
A recent case that has been placed on a fast-track post-Kelo and that
is attracting significant media attention is also illustrative of the vast
power that large corporate interests can have on municipalities and
states. 148 The city of Oakland has evicted two small businesses, Revelli
Tire and Autohouse, from land that the businesses owned, as part of a
redevelopment of the city.14 9 This development is expected to cost $61
million to taxpayers 50 , and will consist in part of a Sears store with an
attached tire store. 151 This instance is one of many in which the threat of
eminent domain over small businesses has attracted media attention.1 52
146 Id. at 107.
147 ld. at 111.
148 See, e.g., FOXNews.com, Oakland Seizes Land, Swaps Retailer, at http://www.fox
news.com/story/0,2933,174519,00.html (Nov. 4, 2005) (presenting primarily the viewpoint of
one of the businesses affected by the eminent domain situation in Oakland); see also Jim
Herron Zamora, City Forces Out Two Downtown Businesses Action Follows High Court Rul-
ing on Eminent Domain, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 2, 2005, at B3 (describing the
Oakland redevelopment plans from multiple perspectives).
149 See FOXNews.com, supra note 148; see also Zamora, supra note 148.
150 Zamora, supra note 148.
151 See FOXNews.com, supra note 148.
152 See, e.g., Lynn Arave, Y'all Come! Ogden Leaders Eager to Get a Wal-Mart, DESERT
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 14, 2004, at B3 (reporting a situation where plans to build a Wal-Mart
were thwarted). Another example of undue private influence in economic development tak-
ings, akin to Poletown and Kelo, was found in Mesa, AZ. See Baily v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); see also Berliner, supra note 67, at 16. There an Arizona Appellate
court struck down the condemnation of two small businesses as inviolate of the "public use"
restriction in the Arizona Constitution. See Baily v. Myers at 899; Berliner at 16. Alterna-
tively, in another situation, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the condemnation of land
by the City of Yonkers' Community Development Agency that initiated proceedings to trans-
fer land to Otis Elevator Company, a leading employer in Yonkers, despite the fact that the
City made no more than a "bare pleading" that the area in which the land was located was
"substandard." See Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331-33 (N.Y.
1975). Similarly in Minnesota, the appellate court upheld the condemnation order of an auto
dealership for a blighted area because of the closeness of the auto dealerships to residential
areas, but the land was then transferred to a Best Buy to build a store. See Hous. And Redev.
Auth. For Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Minn. 2001). In some
cases, pressure from the surrounding community forced big businesses to back out despite
impending approval of condemnation. See, e.g., Debra West, Ikea Wants to Move In, but
Neighbors Fight Moving Out, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 1, 2001, at BI; Winnie Hu, lkea Cancels Plans
for Store in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at BI. Similarly, the City of Pittsburgh,
PA, wanted to replace sixty-four downtown buildings that included "restaurants, flower shops
and a 144-year-old optometry business," with a $500 million retail project that would have
yielded $181,000 more in annual property tax revenues at a cost of $70 million to taxpayers.
See Eminent Thievery, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2001, at A26. The project was halted, however,
after Nordstrom, a proposed anchor tenant of the project, chose not to pursue the deal. Id. The
CORRECTING FOR KELO
B. CREATIVE SOLUTIONS
Despite these instances of abuse of ordinary citizens and the impli-
cations of Kelo, this Article does not advocate a categorical ban on eco-
nomic development.' 53 If economic development takings were banned,
cities may respond by retaining ownership of seized land, but "con-
tracting it out" via leases to powerful private interests for private devel-
opment.' 54 Such arrangements are already common practices in other
contexts, such as when cities or their airport authorities enter into restau-
rant leases with private parties in airports, or when they enter into con-
tracts for private garbage collection services.' 55 Also, there may be
legitimate instances in which governments may use eminent domain for
the right kind of economic development.
Other scholars have argued that strict scrutiny should be applied to
economic development takings as a way to guard against exploitation of
the average citizen.' 56 For instance, these scholars assert the idea that
the taking of a home is more than an ordinary economic right deserving
New York Times has itself been the recipient of eminent domain largesse from the government
in the form of the Empire State Development Corporation. See David W. Dunlap, Blight to
Some is Home to Others: Concern over Displacement by a New Times Building. N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 2001, at DI (illustrating how the development corporation condemned a city block in
Times Square for construction of a new New York Times building, forcing the removal of
countless businesses, a dormitory, and hundreds of homes).
153 Compare Somin, supra note 82, at 1007 (discussing the need for a "categorical ban"
on the used of eminent domain for economic development as a way to alleviate the problems
posed by Poletown). Supreme courts in at least three states have banned economic develop-
ment takings. See Wayne County v. Hathcock (denying proposed condemnations since they
did not "advance a 'public use"'); Sw. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1,
9 (Il1. 2002) (dismissing the economic development justification because "every lawful busi-
ness" adds to the economy); City of Owensboro, Kentucky v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7
(Ky. 1979) (brushing aside economic development justifications for the use of eminent domain
because "[e]very legitimate business, to a greater or lesser extent, indirectly benefits the public
by benefiting the people who constitute the state."); see also Somin supra note 82, at 1009-10.
154 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV.
543, 552 (2000) (stating that "[iln the last half century, the private nonprofit sector has become
the primary mechanism for delivering government-financed human services, such as health
care.").
155 Outside of health care, local governments have also contracted out their waste man-
agement and highway construction services. Id.
156 Stephen J. Jones, Note, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scru-
tiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 285, 311-14 (2000); see also Kruckeberg, supra note 90, at 570-73 (comparing the depri-
vation of one's property to the loss of life or liberty, thereby meriting strict scrutiny); see also
Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL.L.REV. 207, 224
(2004) (discussing the need for application of strict scrutiny in cases involving eminent do-
main when land is transferred by the state to a private party, the landowner's interest in the
land is "particularly strong" because, for example, on it is his or her home, and money could
not "significantly compensate" the owner for the loss, and the landowner is "relatively power-
less politically."); see also Jonathan N. Portner, Comment, The Continued Expansion of the
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 17 U. BALT. L. REV., 542 (1988); see also Man-
snerus, supra note 71, at 444 (arguing that "the exercise of eminent domain for third-party use
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of only rational basis scrutiny, but instead is a fundamental right because
of the personal element in a home. 157 They argue that an individual's
interest in his or her home is akin to the rights of life or liberty under the
Due Process Clause.'58
Although cognizant of other proposals designed to address the
power inequities in economic development takings between average citi-
zens and large corporate interests, this Article advocates a different
framework. Not only may there be legitimate situations in which emi-
nent domain should be used for economic development, but also the Su-
preme Court has explicitly affirmed the use of the rational basis test to
scrutinize economic development takings. The Court, therefore, has im-
plicitly rejected a strict scrutiny test.
It appears that, regardless of the theoretical answers proposed to
address the imbalance of power in economic development takings, there
are a number of both practical and creative solutions to which the parties
involved, all landowners and large corporate interests, might privately
agree. For instance, one obvious resolution would be to establish a pre-
mium price, above fair market value, for takings of homes. 159 This pre-
mium would take into account the sentimental or personal value of a
home, including the neighborhood and community,1 60 a value that is
often more than the market would assign and that is placed on the prop-
erty where the landowner is not a willing seller. 16 1 The premium would
also include reasonable costs of relocation or reasonable attorney's fees
should a legal challenge be mounted against a taking, and the cost of a
similar home in a similarly situated neighborhood or area. 162 For in-
stance, the New York and Indiana Legislatures to date are deliberating
legislation that would assess this premium at 25% and 50% above market
value, respectively, for economic development takings. 63 In addition,
requires at a minimum full review for rationality" and the review should entail the application
of an objective, over a good-faith test, that would likely require "a full factual hearing.").
157 Jones, supra note 156, at 309.
158 Id.
159 D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 255, 298-300;
Bukowczyk, supra note 93, at 72 (It is also important to note that the residents in Poletown
received much less than they believed their homes were worth in the judicial settlement, and
they did not receive payment for the cost of replacing their homes).
160 Bukowczyk, supra note 93, at 73.
161 Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988); see
also JACK L. KNETSCH, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPENSATION: COMPULSORY ACQUISITION
AND OTHER LOSSES 36, 39-40 (1983) (underscoring the notion that many landowners place a
higher value, than that of the market, on their homes because of emotional attachments to them
and to their neighborhoods).
162 Barros, supra note 159, at 299-300; accord Gallagher, supra note 94, at 1869-70, and
Bukowczyk, supra note 93, at 73 (noting that the premium should include an amount related to
the cost of construction of a "new building of the same size and style as the structure being
condemned, possibly less a depreciation factor.").
163 Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2006, at I A.
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some scholars have proposed that the premium be tied, on a sliding scale,
to the length of residence in a home. 164 Small-business owners would be
similarly compensated for loss in fair market value of their land, for the
value of the good will of the business correlated with the number of
years the business had occupied the land, and the costs of relocation and
construction of a similar building in a comparable area. 1
65
Another creative, albeit expensive and likely impractical, solution
would be to require the state and large corporate interests to meet the
price named by the displaced landowners. 166
Without resorting to takings, another promising solution to accumu-
late land for an economic development project would be to have land-
owners whose properties are slated for the development, to share in the
profits that the development would generate. 167 There is precedent for
this proposed solution in Atlanta, where thirty-nine African-American
families were able to receive shares in the commercial development pro-
ject that replaced their neighborhood. 16 8
It should be remembered that countless successful economic devel-
opment projects, such as Disney World, 169 have been built without resort
to eminent domain, though it is often cited as a necessary tool for rede-
velopment against individuals who attempt to "hold out" for the maxi-
mum price for their land. When it comes to holdouts, however, Euclid,
Ohio, tried an unusual but fresh approach. When a developer that
wanted to build a marina and a luxury high-rise development on Lake
Erie urged the city to use eminent domain on remaining holdout land-
owners, the city was well aware of the possibility of a public outcry from
residents. Thereafter, the Mayor and a City Council member wrote a
polite letter to remaining landowners requesting their cooperation and
offering their willingness to meet with landowners in reaching a "satis-
factory resolution."'170 The developer was able to secure almost all of the
land that it needed. Moreover, in exchange for one landowner selling an
adjacent rental house and a vacant lot to the developer, he remained in
his house while the development was built around him.17
1
164 Barros, supra note 159, at 33.
165 Bukowczyk, supra note 93, at 72-73.
166 Id. at 73.
167 Id.
168 Id. (citing Roger Witherspoon, Profits Out of Thin Air in Johnsontown, BLACK ENTER-
PRISE 65-68 (Dec. 1982)).
169 Roger Pilon, Kelo v. City of New London and U.S. Supreme Court Decision and
Strengthening the Ownership of Private Property Act of 2005, Testimony before the US House
Committee on Agriculture, Sept. 7, 2005; see also Somin, supra note 82, at 1026.
170 Thomas Ott, Euclid Tried Polite Approach in Property Dispute, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Aug. 26, 2002, at B3.
171 Thomas Ott, Developers Offer to Let Holdout Keep House, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept.
20, 2002, at B3.
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In Pittsburgh, instead of resorting to eminent domain on a holdout
48-year-old pizzeria for the planned redevelopment of an old Sears store
into a Home Depot, Home Depot agreed to house the pizzeria in its park-
ing lot.172 Furthermore, in a similar move in Huntington Beach, Califor-
nia, after the city voted against using eminent domain to condemn a mall
in favor of private developers, but awarded the project to developers who
included discount retailers, most of whom opposed the initial project, in
the new 2.8 million-square-foot outdoor retail and entertainment
complex. 17
3
C. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE EFFECT OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS ON THE AVERAGE CITIZEN:
SOCIAL CAPITAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
Despite the array of creative solutions that can be used to restore the
balance of power in proposed eminent domain takings, the need exists
for a novel framework that courts may use to examine post-Kelo eco-
nomic development takings.' 74 It is likely that the floodgates of eminent
domain abuse may open wide post-Kelo as a result of the combination of
the following several factors: 1) the current fervor by many "desperate"
cities for urban revitalization; 2) the high degree of deference expressly
accorded the legislature by the Supreme Court regarding economic de-
velopment takings, even though it is the well-financed political insiders
being served by the legislature and not the interests of ordinary citizens;
3) the Supreme Court's failure in Kelo to define the largely opaque re-
quirement of an "integrated, balanced, or comprehensive" economic de-
velopment plan; and 4) the Kelo Court's refusal to hold municipalities
and states accountable even when faced with striking evidence that the
public benefits promised are often never realized.
Many economic development takings involve takings of land owned
by generally small groups of average citizens who are individual home-
172 See Tom Barnes, Home Depot to Oust Smaller Businesses, PITTSBURGH POsT-GA.
zETrE, Mar. 9, 1998, at A 1l; see Lawrence Walsh, This Store's Opening is Simply Grand,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Feb. 11, 2000, at B1.
173 Property Rights Victories, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Nov. 26, 2000, at 2; Jim
Hinch, Mall Project Seen as a Winner; Development Huntington Hopes to Reverse a History
of Plans Falling Through, ORANGE CouNTY REGISTER, Mar. 8, 2002, at 4. Other creative tools
that government can use to encourage economic development, in lieu of eminent domain,
include cutting red tape for building permits and property owners who wish to relocate, reduc-
ing fees for development application, and building around holdouts. See Jordan R. Rose, Emi-
nent Domain Abuse in Arizona: The Growing Threat to Private Property, ARIZONA ISSUE
ANALYSIS 174, Aug. 16, 2002, at 8, available at http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/arti-
cle.php/134.html.
174 See supra Part I. and notes 11-23 and accompanying text (noting that the current
judicial framework does not take into account contemporary realities of economic
development).
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owners or small business owners. Examples of these takings abound and
include the petitioners in Kelo, 99 Cents,' 75 SWIDA, 176 Casino Redevel-
opment Authority,177 Bailey v. Myers, 178 and Richfield.'79 Other exam-
ples include the owner of the Rivelli Tire Store that the city of Oakland
wanted to replace with a Sears,180 the New Rochelle, New York, home-
owners who resisted the taking of their land for an IKEA, 18' the Ogden,
Utah, residents who opposed the development of a Wal-Mart on their
land,182 and the small business owners and residents displaced by the
construction of a new New York Times building in Manhattan. 183
It is logical that these economic development takings would occur
where the cost of land in many of these areas, often due to previous
neglect by city leaders. Moreover, in the midst of the popular wave of
urban revitalization, land has been identified as valuable because it is
waterfront property, as was the case in Kelo, 184 or because large corpo-
rate interests have identified the property as desirable, as evidenced in
Poletown, Kelo, Casino Redevelopment Authority, Bailey, and Richfield.
Typically an undue share of the costs of these takings are borne by ordi-
nary residents, those who lack significant political influence with munici-
pal leaders that approve many urban revitalization projects or with state
legislators that promulgate enabling statutes for eminent domain.
Given the current legal and political environment in the wake of
Kelo, this Article proposes that courts establish common law, or state or
federal enact enabling legislation, that would require a social impact
study of the social effects of economic development takings on average
citizens, whose interests are currently devalued by the economic devel-
175 See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
177 727 A.2d 102, 106, 110 (N.J. Super. 1998).
178 76 P.3d 898, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
179 630 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn. App. 2001).
180 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Plans are in the works to use eminent domain to seize waterfront property in Riviera
Beach, Florida, a predominantly African-American town and neighborhood. See generally
Dennis Cauchon, Pushing the Limits of 'Public Use', USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2004, at A03; Pat
Beall, Riviera Beach Eminent Domain Case Draws National Spotlight, PALMBEACHPOST, Dec.
11, 2005, at IA; John-Thor Dahlburg, An Eminent High Tide, LA TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005 at
A12. Similar plans are intended for the Cramer Hill section of Camden, New Jersey, a
predominantly minority neighborhood located on the Delaware River across from Philadel-
phia. See generally Cramer Hill Association Looks Out for Residents, COURIER-POST ONLINE,
Feb. I, 2006, available at www.courierpostonline.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/200602;
New Jersey FIT: Future In Transportation, available at http://www.state.nj.us/transportationl
works/njfit/case/route30.shtm (describing the Cramer Hill Redevelopment Project); Dwight
Ott, Camden Wants Judge to Revisit Cramer Hill Ruling, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 3,
2006, at B03.
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opment takings process. Similar environmental studies, termed Environ-
mental Impact Studies (EIS) and Environmental Impact Assessments
(EIA), are already prescribed in the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969.185
1. NEPA-EISs
Some view NEPA as an "environmental constitution"' 86 because it
was promulgated to ensure environmental harmony, and to avert damage
to the environment,187 by making information available to the public in
an effort to compel federal "agencies to incorporate environmental val-
ues into their thinking."'18 8 The Act requires that all agencies of the
federal government prepare an EIS on all "Federal actions [a project,
regulation, policy, or permit issuance] significantly affecting the quality"
of the environment. 89 The EIS is meant to be an "action-forcing mecha-
nism."' 190 It is a detailed statement that addresses:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii)
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alter-
natives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship be-
tween local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.' 9 '
In addition, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has estab-
lished regulations that implement NEPA. 192 The regulations mandate
that the lead agency preparing the draft EIS make it available to the pub-
lic and other agencies early enough in the decision-making process for
185 42 U.S.C § 4321-4375 (2006) [hereinafter NEPA].
186 Jeannette MacMillan, Book Note, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in
Domestic Environmental Law: NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks (Department
of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 491, 494 (2005).
187 See id. at 494-95.
188 JAMES P. LESTER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE
245 (1995).
189 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2006). Some agency ac-
tions, however, may categorically require an EIS. See Kern v. United States Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
190 MacMillan, supra note 186, at 495.
191 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
192 Council on Environmental Quality, "Guidance Regarding NEPA Regulations", 48
Fed. Reg. 34,263 (July 28, 1983), available at: http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/regs/l1983/
1983guid.htm.
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comments to meaningfully affect the agency's decision, 9 3 to which the
lead agency must subsequently respond in the final EIS. 194 Because of
the detail required, EISs can be costly, ranging from "hundreds of
thousands of dollars to several million dollars."'195 EISs generally take
one to two years, if not longer, to complete.' 9 6
Furthermore, the first step in the NEPA inquiry is an Environmental
Assessment (EA) in which the agency will determine if its action will
significantly impact the environment, thus triggering the need for an
EIS. 197 The public and other agencies are invited to comment on the
EA.19 8 In contrast to EISs, EAs are usually about twelve pages long, do
not include discussion of alternatives to a project, and incorporate scant
analysis of environmental impact' 9 9 If the agency determines that there
is no significant impact after performing the EA, then it prepares a Find-
ing of No Significant Impact (FONSI).200
a) Judicial Review
NEPA provides no provisions for judicial review. It has instead
been construed to incorporate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
with review of matters arising under NEPA using the APA's "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of review. 20 1 In certain cases, the standard of
review falls under a "rule of reason." An agency may decide (1) not to
prepare an initial EIS, 20 2 (2) to perform an EIS, but one that certain inter-
est groups deem inadequate under NEPA, 203 (3) not to compile a supple-
193 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2006) (requiring that once an agency decides that it will under-
take an EIS and before it publishes a draft EIS, it must publish a Notice of Intent that provides
public participation in determining the "scope" of the EIS and significant issues related to it),
and 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (inviting comments by the public and other agencies).
194 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (requiring that the lead agency respond to the public's comments);
see also Brian Cole, et. al., Prospects for Health Impact Assessment in the United States: New
and Improved Environmental Impact Assessment or Something Different?, 29 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 1153, 1162 (2004).
195 Cole, supra note 194, at 1163-64.
196 Id. at 1163.
197 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2006).
198 Id.
199 Cole, supra note 194, at 1164.
200 Kern v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 284 F.3d 1062, 1067.
201 MacMillan, supra note 186, at 497.
202 See, e.g., Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1330-32 (9th Cir. 1992) (up-
holding the "arbitrary and capricious" standard when assessing the need for an initial EIS and
ensuring that the agency has taken a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of its
action in a case involving an agency's decision to raise fishing levels of pollock without con-
sidering its effect on the population of the Steller sea lion in an EIS); Audobon Soc'y of Cent.
Arkansas v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the Army Corps. of Engi-
neers was required to undertake an EIS regarding its grant of a permit to build a bridge).
203 This standard of review is the "rule of reason." See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Val-
ley, 490 U.S. 332, 358-59 (1989) (stating that "[i]t was surely not unreasonable for the Forest
Service" to include a more developed mitigation plan of environmental effects in its EIS);
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mental EIS, 2°4 or (4) to perform an EA, but one that is similarly regarded
by interested parties as insufficient under NEPA.20 5
In general, however, "NEPA forces a process but not an out-
come. ' 20 6 The process should be "fully informed and well-consid-
ered," 20 7 but ultimately courts are not able to make decisions on the
substantive actions that may be taken, whether or not they would agree
with the agency. 20 8
b) Assessment of NEPA
The EIS process in NEPA has been roundly criticized for being too
burdensome, costly, and time-consuming. 2°9 Other criticism has cen-
tered around NEPA's heavy emphasis on process, to the detriment of
substance. 210 One scholar has noted that "[t]o this day, the Supreme
Court has never decided in favor of a NEPA-plaintiff."121 While lower
courts have some history of rulings favorable to NEPA plaintiffs, courts
are nonetheless constrained by the focus on process. 212
However, Lynton Caldwell, the "intellectual father of EIS" and a
public administration professor,213 notes that although "NEPA has not
come near to realizing its full potential," its success in influencing deci-
sion-making regarding environmental policy should not be underesti-
mated.2 14 Due to NEPA, federal projects have been reconsidered,
redesigned, or even withdrawn if the environmental consequences are too
severe. 215 For instance, projects that would have impacted old-growth
Kern, 284 F.3d at 1071(citing Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9th
Cir. 1997) (stating that "[i]n reviewing the adequacy of an EIS, we employ a 'rule of reason to
determine whether the EIS contains a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects
of probable environmental consequences"' that ensures that the agency took a "hard look" at
the consequences)).
204 This standard of review, like that which governs an initial EIS, is the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374-75
(1989) (noting that NEPA requires that agencies take a similar "hard look" at environmental
consequences and that the Court will review this "hard look" under the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard).
205 For instance, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the "rule of reason" governs this deci-
sion of an agency under NEPA. See Kern, 284 F.3d at 1070 (stating that "[an agency's
threshold decision that certain activities are not subject to NEPA is reviewed for
reasonableness.").
206 Cole, supra note 194, at 1170-71.
207 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
208 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
209 MacMillan, supra note 186, at 521; see also Cole, supra note 194, at 1169.
210 Cole, supra note 194, at 1170.
211 Macmillan, supra note 186, at 523.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 517.
214 Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, 22 HARv. ENV'rL. L. REV. 203, 205, 207 (1998).
215 Id. at 207.
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forests or the northern spotted owl have been halted as a result of the EIS
process.2
16
In addition, the public comment and information required in NEPA
has given structure to public debate concerning projects of environmental
import that otherwise would not have occurred without free disclo-
sure.217 Indeed, this scrutiny has empowered environmental and commu-
nity groups to participate in the decision-making process, a process from
which they were previously excluded. 218 Moreover, because of the pub-
lic disclosure mandated in NEPA, decision-makers in federal agencies
have been prodded to make more "responsible" and "better informed"
decisions from the outset. 219 Finally, NEPA has fostered more inter-
agency cooperation on plans, and has provided more information to other
potential decision-makers, such as legislators. 220 Therefore, there is an
argument that the procedural, if not costly at times, tendencies of NEPA
are far outweighed by the Act's benefits, namely the empowerment of
previously excluded environmental and community groups.
2. Social Capital Impact Assessments
Thomas Sander22' has identified several socioeconomic factors
within a project that may have significant environmental consequences
and thus trigger an EIS that may be used to form a Social Capital Impact
Statement (SCIS). 222  This paper, however, proposes that many of
216 See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (D. Wash. 1988) (halting at-
tempts to log the habitat of the northern spotted owl after it was declared a threatened species
by the Fish & Wildlife Service); see also Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements
and Their Lessons for Social Capital Analysis, available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/sa-
guaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf at 2 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2005) (citing Mark Bonnet
& Mark Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the North-
ern Spotted Owl, ECOLOGY L.Q. 105-71 (1991)).
217 MacMillan, supra note 186, at 529; see also Caldwell, supra note 214, at 207.
218 Cole, supra note 194, at 1168-69 (". . . NEPA has created an opportunity for public
review and feedback on projects where previously there was little if any such opportunity.").
See also Caldwell, supra note 214, at 207 ("To the extent that the NEPA Process informs
decisionmaking, the Act must generally be accounted a success. It has caused reconsideration,
redesign, and even withdrawal of federal projects that previously would have gone forward
without effective challenge. It has forced the public disclosure of plans and proposals which
previously would have been shielded from public scrutiny.").
2t9 Cole, supra note 194, at 1169.
220 Caldwell, supra note 214, at 207; see also MacMillan, supra note 186, at 519-20.
221 Thomas Sander is EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE SAGUARO SEMINAR: Civic ENGAGE-
MENT IN AMERICA, a program of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University.
222 Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements and Their Lessons for Social Capi-
tal Analysis, available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf,
at 3 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2005). These socioeconomic factors are "I) Will the action affect
neighborhood character and cohesion?, 2) Will the action cause displacement and relocation
of homes, families, and businesses?, 3) For airport and highway projects, will surface-traffic
disruption affect access to community facilities, recreation areas, and places of residence and
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Sander's factors, as well as others identified below, could similarly be
required in three possible ways with respect to economic development
takings in a Social Capital Impact Assessment (SCIA). First, courts,
likely the Supreme Court, could mandate that SCIAs be performed and
examined, in conjunction with an economic development plan, to ensure
that the necessary consequences and alternatives are considered before
embarking upon a potentially disastrous project. Second, states could
require as part of their enabling legislation for economic development
takings, that SCIAs be executed at an early enough time in a develop-
ment proposal's history to allow for meaningful public comment on a
project. The timing seems perfect for states' to pay their considerations
of this proposal, given the legislative reaction of thirty-nine states to Kelo
on the issue of takings for economic development. 22 3 Third, SCIAs
could be placed into not only all future federal legislation contemplating
restrictions on economic development takings, 224 but also into federal
enabling legislation for these types of takings that are applicable to
Washington, D.C., that was at issue in Berman.2
25
a) Components of SCIAs
SCIAs for economic development takings should likely include, at a
minimum, a response to the following questions, which largely track the
concerns outlined in Part III of this article, with studies or data to support
the answers:
1. How will the taking or development project disrupt
existing land uses?
2. How will the taking or development affect neigh-
borhood integrity?
3. Will the taking or revitalization project displace
and relocate homes, families, and businesses?
4. What opposition, if any, exists to the taking or
project?
5. If neighborhood integrity is to be affected or the
taking or revitalization project is to displace
homes, families, and businesses, how can these ef-
fects be mitigated?
business?, 4) Will the action affect the quality of life of the residents of the area?, 5) Will the
action increase traffic flow and congestion? and 6) Will the action divide or disrupt existing
land uses?" Id. Indeed, Sander infers that had a SCIS been incorporated into the EIS for
Poletown, it might have proved helpful to the residents there. Id. at 4.
223 See Broder, supra note 5.
224 See supra note 6.
225 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
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6. If displacement and relocation identified in Ques-
tion Three occur, how many homes, families, and
businesses will be relocated?
7. If displacement and relocation occur, what oppor-
tunities be made available for displaced residents
to occupy space in the new development as a home
or as a small business? 226
8. If there is no plan to have displaced residents oc-
cupy space in the new development as a home or
as a small business, what proposals do the relevant
government entities have to relocate residents or
small business owners to an equivalent site?
9. What is the economic impact of the displacement
of these homes, families, and businesses on the city
and state's purse, in the form of lost real property
and sales taxes, jobs generated by small businesses
that may be displaced, and revenues generated by
these businesses?
10. What is the ethnic and racial breakdown of the
families who may be displaced?
11. What is the promised economic impact of the tak-
ings, in terms of employment opportunities and tax
revenue gained?
12. Is the promised economic impact referred to in
Question Eleven realistic and practical, in light of
other potentially uncontrollable factors, such as the
availability of financing for the project, key tenants
and institutions that may occupy the project, or the
economic health of these key tenants?
13. What ties, if any, do the private entities that stand
to gain from the economic development project
have with any state or local governments exercis-
ing eminent domain or promulgating legislation in
support of its exercise?
14. What alternatives exist to placing the economic de-
velopment project in the proposed site?
226 Housing provisions in the new development plan for some of the displaced residents
in Berman were specifically noted by the Court in that case. Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-3 1. At
least one-third of the new residential units were to be "low-rent housing with a maximum
rental of $17 per room per month." Id.
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b) The SCIA Process
Just as with EISs in NEPA, SCIAs would incorporate both pre-draft
and draft versions, to which the public and other decision-makers could
respond. 22 7 They would also include final versions in which the entity
seeking to use an economic development taking would respond to public
comments. 22 8 In addition, provisions for supplemental SCIAs should be
included, in case the initial assessment is inadequate. Moreover, because
of the heightened sensitivities that may result when economic develop-
ment takings are proposed, public hearings and public comments should
be incorporated at each stage of the process to allow for meaningful pub-
lic input. A reasonable page limit and plain English requirement should
be placed on the SCIA to ensure that the general public can readily un-
derstand the document.
Furthermore, the fourteen questions suggested in Part IV.C.2.i.
could be further expanded and standards added to ensure a consistent
process. These questions are designed to ensure greater transparency and
balance of power between the public, private interest, and government
that largely acts in favor of corporate interests to the exclusion of the
community.
In addition, the expanded opportunity for notice and comment by
the public also furthers another goal - by raising the bar for approval of
economic development takings, the government is forced to seek consen-
sus among affected and interested parties. This consensus could lead to
several favorable outcomes: (1) wholesale elimination of a project that
contemplates takings, (2) revision of a project to take into account a
community's needs, and (3) when takings are unavoidable, increased ec-
onomic bargaining power for traditionally less powerful communities
faced with the threat of loss of home and business.
Due to the pressing need for this type of information, SCIAs should
be mandated by the courts or by the legislatures for all economic devel-
opment takings. On the other hand, there is the counterargument that a
mandatory process would only be obstructionist. This process would in-
crease bureaucratic red tape, engender resistance, and perhaps waste time
and resources for economic development takings that might not have a
significant impact.2 29 Given the success of EISs and NEPA in empower-
ing previously disaffected communities, increased transparency, resulted
in greater participation and influence by average Joe communities, will
likely offset these perceived negative attributes of SCIAs.
227 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2006) (inviting public comment).
228 40 C.F.R. § 1504.1 (2006) (noting that the lead federal agency proposing the develop-
ment shall respond to comments made in part by the public in the final EIS).
229 See Cole, supra note 194, at 1176 (supporting the use of Health Impact Assessments
as part of EISs or as free-standing documents).
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Standards for judicial review would depend on the goals of SCIAs.
If the goal is to ensure a process, one that is consistent and standardized
throughout a particular state or other jurisdiction, then, as with EISs in
NEPA, there are three items that are of utmost importance in procedur-
ally focused SCIAs. First, the public must be able to access information
at a reasonably early date concerning an economic development taking.
Second, the public must have the ability to respond at an appropriate
time, through public hearings and written comments, to contemplated
governmental action. Third, as in NEPA's EISs, the government, and
any corporate interests proposing an economic development project that
involves takings, must meaningfully demonstrate that it has integrated
and responded to any concerns by the public in a final version of the
SCIA.230
On the other hand, the goal of SCIAs might be to ensure a particular
substantive outcome. The lack of emphasis on substantive outcomes in
NEPA has been a long-standing point of contention with critics of the
statute. Moreover, given the power that corporate interests may wield
over government and, as a consequence, government's largely dismissive
approach to affected landowners who do not wield equivalent influence
in economic development takings, a substantive focus to SCIAs might,
therefore, be urged. With an emphasis solely on process, an SCIA may
simply be inadequate as a way to countervail the influence of large cor-
porate interests over desperate cities. The result would be more of the
same, landowners of lesser power would still be bereft of house and
small business, left with the cold comfort of more documentation that
simply explains how they arrived at the same place.
Ultimately, however, this Article advocates a concentration on pro-
cess with respect to SCIAs for several reasons. First, in reviewing
SCIAs under NEPA, courts have been extremely reluctant to assess the
substantive outcomes of a particular decision by federal agencies regard-
ing a project that may have deleterious environmental consequences on a
community. 231 Therefore, judicial precedent that supports a more proce-
dural stance towards EISs, akin to SCIAs, has already been set. There-
fore, it is unlikely that courts would take a more substantive approach to
SCIAs. Moreover, the Court's decision in Kelo, in which it took a
"hands-off' approach to substantively assessing the economic develop-
ment project at issue in New London, 232 also might suggest that the judi-
ciary would be likely unwilling to judge a particular outcome of a SCIA.
230 See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
231 See, e.g., Greenpeace Action, 14 F. 3d 1324, 1330-32 (9th Cir. 1992) supra note 203
(ruling not on substantive outcomes, but on the need for EISs). See also Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (noting that
NEPA is "essentially procedural").
232 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
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In addition, if courts were to step into the role of ensuring a particu-
lar substantive outcome, it is unclear exactly what that outcome should
be. From the perspective of an affected landowner or community that
believes that they have been negatively impacted by an economic devel-
opment taking, the belief would be that a court should determine a hold-
ing or outcome in their favor. On the other hand, a desperate city and
any of its private economic development partners would likely desire a
ruling that supports the project, even though it contemplates the use of
eminent domain and may indelibly transform a community. Operating
under the belief that courts and justice are supposed to be blind and unbi-
ased towards any particular party, it is difficult to reconcile this premise
with the notion that the judiciary should be placed in the position of
ensuring a particular result. Employing a process-oriented approach to
SCIAs by the courts is, therefore, the preferable course.
In light of the undeniable success of NEPA in opening up access,
accountability, and information to the public, and thereby fomenting the
creation of numerous socially aware environmental groups, benefits
should accrue to politically marginalized and less powerful landowners
and communities in the eminent domain context. This article suggests
that placing more information in the hands of previously excluded com-
munities and therefore encouraging meaningful participation in decisions
related to economic development takings, are successes in themselves.
Therefore, if the goal is to ensure a process by which the public,
government, and private beneficiaries of economic development takings
will be more informed, then the applicable standard of review should be
that already used in assessing NEPA cases. For instance, to assess the
adequacy of a government's SCIA, the "rule of reason" should be
used. 233 On the other hand, the judicial standard of review for a case in
which it is argued that a supplemental SCIA is necessary should invoke
an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 234
c) Assessment of SCIAs
SCIAs will likely require more time, expense, and work for the par-
ties involved, as well as for the courts that are charged with reviewing
them. However, given the checkered history of economic development
takings and their failure to deliver the public benefits that were promised,
the investment in a SCIA may be miniscule compared to the investment
of taxpayer dollars that are used to support an unviable project and the
unnecessary bad will that is engendered by a lack of meaningful public
debate. By virtue of the time, expense, and public disclosure, SCIAs will
233 See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
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provide incentives for government and private party decision-makers to
consider thoughtfully and carefully the ramifications and consequences
of their plans.
In addition, more information will be provided to the public, and
average citizens would have more of an opportunity to participate and to
influence economic development projects that call for the use of eminent
domain. The assessments would likely empower ordinary citizens, as
NEPA has similarly empowered environmental groups. Finally, SCIAs
and the public scrutiny to which they will be subject, will likely correct,
for the lack of political power and influence that average citizens do not
have, especially when measured against that wielded by large corporate
interests.
D. STUDIES PERFORMED IN Kelo
In Kelo, two studies were performed. One study, commissioned by
the New London Development Corporation, focused on the pure eco-
nomic impact of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment project on the city of
New London and New London County. 235 The second study236 was per-
formed pursuant to the Connecticut Environmental Policy Act, 237 and it
required an Environmental Impact Evaluation (EIE)238 or a Finding of
235 See generally Fred Carstensen et al., The Economic Impact of the Pfizer and Fort
Trumbull Development Projects, Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis, (2001), available
at http://ccea.uconn.edu/studies/New%20London%2OCity%201mpact%20Study-Final%20
Report.pdf (last visited on Aug. 24, 2006).
236 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659 n.2; see also Brief of the State of Connecticut, Through
its Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents at
5, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
237 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1, et seq. (2006).
238 According to Connecticut law, EIEs must detail the following: "(1) A description of
the proposed action which shall include, but not be limited to, a description of the purpose and
need of the proposed action, and, in the case of a proposed facility, a description of the infra-
structure needs of such facility, including, but not limited to, parking, water supply, waste-
water treatment and the square footage of the facility; (2) the environmental consequences of
the proposed action, including cumulative, direct and indirect effects which might result during
and subsequent to the proposed action; (3) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided and irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources should the proposal be
implemented; (4) alternatives to the proposed action, including the alternative of not proceed-
ing with the proposed action and, in the case of a proposed facility, a list of all the sites
controlled by or reasonably available to the sponsoring agency that would meet the stated
purpose of such facility; (5) an evaluation of the proposed action's consistency and each alter-
native's consistency with the state plan of conservation and development, an evaluation of
each alternative including, to the extent practicable, whether it avoids, minimizes or mitigates
environmental impacts, and, where appropriate, a description of detailed mitigation measures
proposed to minimize environmental impacts, including, but not limited to, where appropriate,
a site plan; (6) an analysis of the short term and long term economic, social and environmental
costs and benefits of the proposed action; (7) the effect of the proposed action on the use and
conservation of energy resources; and (8) a description of the effects of the proposed action on
sacred sites or archaeological sites of state or national importance. In the case of an action
which affects existing housing, the evaluation shall also contain a detailed statement analyzing
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No Significant Impact (FONSI) to be performed and approved by the
Connecticut Office of Policy Management. 239
Because of the Fort Trumbull project's impact on homes, Connecti-
cut law also required that the EIE in Kelo examine the indirect and direct
effects on housing, based on race and income levels of the residents in
Fort Trumbull, as well as whether the impact on housing was consistent
with the state's long-term housing initiative.2 40 The Connecticut Office
of Policy Management concluded that the economic development project
did not conflict with the state's housing goals.24'
Connecticut's inclusion of these social factors in the EIE, such as
the project's impact on housing categorized by race and income levels, is
to be commended. The inclusion of these social factors responds to
Questions Three, Six, and Ten in the alternative framework of SCIAs.
However, in comparison to the alternative framework proposed by this
Article the Connecticut law does not delve as deeply into the details of
economic development projects, such as the influence that a private in-
terest may have on it, any opposition that may be percolating against a
project, and whether theoretical public benefits may mesh with what the
public will actually receive.242
CONCLUSION
In today's context, economic development takings must be viewed
through the dual prisms of the exploding popularity of urban revitaliza-
tion and cities' desperate measures to expand their tax and revenue bases.
Given these twin guideposts in the economic development environment,
the Court's decision in Kelo may have created a situation that is ripe for
abuse and further advantages those with the most power at the expense of
those with the least.
(A) housing consequences of the proposed action, including direct and indirect effects which
might result during and subsequent to the proposed action by income group as defined in
section 8-37aa and by race, and (B) the consistency of the housing consequences with the
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242 Similarly, in Poletown, an EIS was required because of the federal dollars spent to
fund the project. The EIS "examined the economic, social, and physical impacts of the pro-
ject." JONES & BACHELOR, supra note 87, at 86. However, Detroit received a waiver to the
requirement that the EIS had to be completed before federal funds were to be released because
the city "emphasized the deadlines set by GM." Id. at 85. Ultimately, the EIS had little effect,
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CORRECTING FOR KELO
For instance, the Supreme Court in Kelo deferred to the judgment of
the legislature, refusing to hold cities and large corporate interests ac-
countable for public benefits promised but seldom yielded, and paid trib-
ute to the "sustaining hand" of many large private interests in economic
development takings. The lack of safeguards against harmful economic
development takings is frightening to the average citizen faced with the
threat of his or her home or small business being seized for economic
development. In light of these factors, it is important that these takings
be examined under an alternative framework that attempts to re-weight
the balance of power between "desperate" government, its private back-
ers, and the average Joe.
While there have been several proposals that attempt to re-balance
the power structure between these three groups, including the application
of a strict scrutiny test to economic development takings and a number of
economically creative solutions, this Article proposes a new analytical
framework for examining economic development takings. Taking a page
from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), this new construct
involves the application of a consistent process in which Social Capital
Impact Assessments (SCIAs), either mandated by the legislatures in ena-
bling legislation or by the courts, would be the focal point.
The emphasis on process will also mandate that governments mean-
ingfully respond to a number of questions regarding the economic and
social impact of a proposed economic development project that involves
takings on a community. In addition, this process would require that the
public not only have an opportunity to comment at an early stage on any
projects, but also that government address these comments in a meaning-
ful way. Furthermore, similar to the review of Environmental Impact
Statements in NEPA, judicial review of SCIAs in this new framework
will ensure that a certain procedure has been conformed to, rather than
ensuring a specific outcome. By providing the public with not only
greater access to information at an early stage of an economic develop-
ment project that contemplates the use of eminent domain, but also
greater opportunities to influence it, it is possible that the average citizen
will be empowered and the balance of power between him or her, the
government, and powerful corporate interests will be altered. Finally, as
evidenced by experience with NEPA, the judiciary is vital in ensuring a
process and thereby bridging the power gap in economic development
takings between the average Joe, "desperate" cities, and powerful private
interests.
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